In everyday vision, attention and awareness are hand in glove and almost impossible to tell apart. Recent work has exploited more contrived situations that allow these psychologically defined processes to be dissociated, providing insights into their respective neurophysiological correlates.
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People working on vision have developed an odd taste for invisible things. More and more reports are being published of large objects in plain view that fail, in one way or another, to reach the observer's awareness. Well-known cases in point include binocular rivalry [1] , flash suppression [2] and motion-induced blindness [3] . The reason for the surge of interest is that the stimuli in question, while invisible to the observer, nevertheless evoke robust neuronal responses up and down the visual pathways. Comparing neuronal responses to visible and to invisible stimuli may lead, so goes the widely shared hope, to no lesser objective than a neural correlate of visual awareness.
Particularly promising in this regard are invisible stimuli that elicit neural activity even in higher areas of visual cortex, as normally visible stimuli do. A text-book example was recently devised by Fang and He [4] , who rendered visual objects invisible by interocular suppression. Specifically, they showed lowcontrast images of tools or faces to one eye and suppressed awareness with high-contrast, dynamic noise images presented to the other eye. In a forced choice task, observers were unable to detect the suppressed object images, confirming their complete lack of awareness. To map cortical activation, the authors established functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) responses to intact object images, with responses to scrambled object images providing a suitable baseline.
Fang and He [4] found that, in spite of their invisibility, tool images activated dorsal visual areas along the intraparietal sulcus at almost normal levels, but did not activate ventral visual areas of the lateral occipital complex. In the case of face images, the interocular suppression prevented activation of both ventral and dorsal visual cortex. Two salient conclusions emerge from this fascinating study: dorsal areas respond to certain object classes, such as tools, in spite of interocular suppression; and awareness is once again seen to correlate with ventral activation, in agreement with the conventional notion that conscious visual perception is supported by ventral (not dorsal) visual cortex [5] .
In this issue of Current Biology, Bahrami et al. [6] report work which takes the paradigm of invisible tool images several steps further. Using some tricks to enhance neuronal responses without jeopardizing invisibility, the authors investigated earlier visual areas, where the activated cortical site depends on stimulus position in the visual field. Comparing different placements of invisible stimuli in the peripheral visual field, the authors identified fMRI activations in response to invisible tool images in visual areas V1, V2 and V3. As this comparison did not yield activations in higher areas -where responses are less sensitive to stimulus position -the information gained is neatly complementary to that of Fang and He [4] .
But Bahrami et al. [6] did not stop at keeping tool images out of visual awareness: they also drew observers' attention away from the peripheral locations at which tool and noise images are being presented, albeit to different eyes ( Figure 1 ). To this end, observers were asked to monitor a slow stream of letters at the center of the visual field and to report the appearance of particular target letters, with different task instructions engaging visual attention to different degrees: complex instructions, such as ''report blue 'Z's and white 'N's'', drawing more attention than simple
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Current Biology Figure 1 . A schematic representation of the display used by Bahrami et al. [6] . At peripheral locations, one eye views high-contrast, dynamic noise images that are visible to the observer. At some of the same locations, the other eye views low-contrast tool objects that remain invisible. Both eyes view identical letters at the center of the visual field. The complexity of a letter-monitoring task controls the extent to which peripheral images are attended.
instructions, such as ''report 'T's of any color''. Without this letter monitoring task, the rapidly flashing noise images, which conceal the invisible tool images, would presumably capture and hold the observers' visual attention in the peripheral visual field. So what did Bahrami et al. [6] hope to achieve by removing both awareness and attention? To understand, we need to recall some basic facts about attention. In our subjective visual experience, we encounter attention in the form of visual effort and voluntary control. Formally, attention selectively enhances and attenuates visual processing to meet current behavioural goals [7] . Attention is not associated with one particular brain site, but seems to result from dynamic interactions between multiple brain areas encoding visual and goal information [8, 9] . When a given stimulus is selected by attention, it typically evokes stronger responses at all neural levels: in the visual thalamus, in early retinotopic areas of cortex, and in higher areas of the ventral and dorsal visual cortex [10] . Psychophysical evidence shows many qualitative and quantitative improvements in the visual awareness of an attended stimulus [11] .
What Bahrami et al. [6] did, therefore, was to ask whether attention modulates responses evoked by an invisible image. In fact, they found that the fMRI activation by invisible tool images did indeed prove higher when attention was allowed to select the image locations -with simple letter monitoring -than when attention was assiduously drawn away -with complex letter monitoring. This result, which was obtained in all three investigated areas (V1, V2 and V3), implies that a neuronal response need not contribute to visual awareness, even though it is enhanced by visual attention. In short, attention does not guarantee awareness.
The dissociation observed by Bahrami et al. [6] -attention without awareness -reinforces previous reports of the opposite dissociation, namely, that observers tend to be aware of salient stimuli outside the current focus of attention -awareness without attention [11, 12] . It looks less and less likely, therefore, that a neural correlate of visual awareness, which is the ultimate goal of this line of research, will bear a close resemblance to the neural basis of attention [13] . The question remains wide open, as to what form a neural correlate of awareness may take -activity of particular cell types, activity of particular areas or connections, or particular forms distributed activity have been considered, with plenty of other possibilities offering to a fertile imagination. The contribution of studies such as those by Fang and He [4] and by Bahrami et al. [6] lies in the neurophysiological dissociation of psychologically defined processes -attention and awareness -that normally operate in tandem and are thus all too easy to conflate.
